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Abstract 
This  paper  examines  the  interplay  between  the  retirement  incentives  generated  by  the 
Spanish public pension system and  the  decision to  early  retire  from the labor force.  For 
many  workers,  particularly those  with below--median earning profiles or with incomplete 
working  histories,  retirement  at  ages  earlier  then  65  appears  to  be  the  most  rational 
strategy.  Indeed we calculate that,  exception made for workers in the upper twenty percent 
of the earnings distribution,  the current system generates strong incentives to  retire before 
the age of 65. We identify the minimum pension rule, embedded in the Spanish legislation, 
as  the most important source of such incentives. We apply the insights from our study to a 
preliminary  evaluation of the  reform legislation just enacted  (July  26,  1997).  We find  it 
doubtful that it may seriously weaken such incentives.  On the contrary, the final  outcome 
may be an increase in the proportion of workers for which the minimum pension is binding, 
thereby increasing the incentive to early retirement. 
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ii 1  Introd  uction 
Public pensions represent the most important welfare program in Spain, absorb-
ing almost 70  percent of the total expenditure for social  protection programs, 
and representing about 11.5 percent of GDP in  1994.  Average annual growth 
rate of public pension expenditures over the period 1980-95 has been 13.1 per-
cent, about 1.5 times higher than the GDP growth rate. 
All  available studies indicate a progressive worsening of the financial  situ-
ation of the Social Security system (sistema de  la  Seguridad Social), the most 
important public pension  program in  Spain.  While we concentrate here on  the 
retirement  incentives  provided  by  the current system  without  addressing  its 
long-run  viability,  a brief overview of its aggregate evolution is  useful  to place 
the subsequent analysis in  a proper perspective. 
The fraction of annual Social Security  (SS)  expenditures which  is  covered 
through direct contributions, from  either workers or employers, has decreased 
steadily from  89.4  percent  in  1980  to 66  percent  in  1995,  the difference  be-
ing  made  up  by  increasingly  large  transfers from  the government.  Even  the 
most optimistic  projections forecast  a continuous increase  in  the current ac-
count deficit of the Spanish SS  system.  Normalizing to zero the deficit of the 
pension system in  1995, the deficit in  2010 is expected to range between .8 and 
3.5  percent of GDP [Herce  (1997)].  The worsening of the deficit  reflects  the 
expectation that the growth of SS  revenues will  not be able to keep up with the 
strong increase in  SS  expenditures,  which  should  grow in  real  terms between 
2.5 and 3.2 percent annually over the next two decades. 
As we explain in  more detail below  (Section 3), the current SS  system pro-
vides five types of contributory pensions:  old-age, disability, widowers, orphans, 
and other relatives.  Over the three subperiods 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95, 
1 total expenditure on each type of contribution-based pension has grown in  real 
terms at annual rates given in  Table 1.  The most important source of pension 
expenditure growth has been demographic changes, followed  by  the widening 
of coverage, and the increase in  real  average pensions.  We  now  provide some 
aggregate indices of the more recent evolution of these three factors. 
Life  expectancy at birth  has increased  by  seven  years over the last three 
decades, from 69.9 years in  1960 to 76.9 in 1991.  This, together with the concur-
rent sharp decline in  natality rates and the impact of the aging baby-boomers, 
is  reflected in  Figure 1,  which  presents the basic trends in  the structure of the 
population  of working  age  (16+) over  the last twenty years.  We  distinguish 
between men  and women and 3 broad age groups:  16-24, 25-54 and 55+. The 
fraction of 16-24 reached  a peak between 1982 and 1987 and has been  falling 
since.  The fraction of 25-54 has been declining till 1988 and is now rising as the 
baby boomers get older.  On  the other hand, the fraction aged  55+ has been 
increasing steadily, although at a decreasing rate. 
Over the three intervals 1980-85, 1985-90 and 1990-95, the annual growth 
rate of the total  number of public  pensions  has  been  equal  to 4.2,  2.8  and 
2.8  percent respectively  (Table 1).  As  of 1994, the total number of contribu-
tory pensions outstanding was equal to 6.9 millions according to the official SS 
records, of which 3.2 millions for old-age, 1.7 millions for disability, 1.8 millions 
for survivors, 168 thousands for orphans and 42 thousands for other relatives. 
The third factor, namely the increase in the real value of average pensions, 
is also captured in Table 1, which reports the annual growth rate of real average 
pensions for  each  group and time interval.  Notice that Spanish  pensions  are 
not particularly generous, at least with respect to the European average.  For 
example, the average pension in  1994 was equivalent to only 47  percent of per-
capita GDP against a  European average of 62 percent.  In  the same year, the 
2 average pension was equal to 63  percent of the average wage and 70  percent of 
the pensions were below the minimum wage. 
This fact suggests,as a tentative hypothesis, that the financial imbalance of 
the Spanish system may not come from  its particular generosity but, instead, 
from  other factors.  The aggregate data reported above illustrate two of them: 
the dramatic shift in  the demographic structure and  the rapid  growth of the 
public  pension  system.  As illustrated in  Section 3 the latter has come about 
since 1972 through the extension of coverage to various groups with either very 
short contributive histories or with a very low  contribution-to-pension ratio. 
A third determinant of the system financial  imbalance  is  the loss  of con-
tributions and the increase in  pension  payments induced  by  the shortening of 
professional lifes  and the parallel growth of early retirement.  In  this study we 
try to document the extent to which  this third  factor may  be  "endogenous" 
to the SS  system.  We  show  that the Spanish  SS  legislation  generates strong 
incentives to retire early and that Spanish workers tend to do so. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents some basic 
facts about labor market behavior and social insurance use of older workers in 
Spain.  Section 3 describes the evolution of the Spanish system since its inception 
and  illustrates  in  relative  detail  its current institutional  features.  Section  4 
presents a set of simulations that illustrate the incentive effects of the current 
system  upon  labor market participation  and  retirement decisions.  Section  5 
offers some conclusions.  Finally, Appendix A describes the main data sets used 
and other sources of information about retirement behavior in  Spain, whereas 
Appendix B briefly reviews the recent literature about retirement in  Spain. 
3 2  Labor market behavior and social insurance use of 
the elderly 
2.1  Historical trends 
Figures 2 and 3 show  the historical  trends in  labor force  participation  rates 
(LFPR)  of older  men  and  women  for  four  age groups:  45-54, 55-59,  60-64, 
and  65+.  The data are taken from  Fermindez  Cordon  (1996)  and consist of 
tabulations based  on  the Spanish  labor force  survey  (Encuesta  de  Poblaci6n 
Activa, or EPA) for  the period 1965-1994. 
Male LFPR have been  falling  for  all  age groups considered.  The sharpest 
decline  is  for  those aged  65+ and 60-64.  While 40  percent of men  aged  65+ 
were  labor force  participants in  1965,  by  1994  this  percentage  was  down  to 
about only  5 percent.  The fall  for  those aged  60-64 starts a  little later but 
is  equally  impressive, from  about 85  percent in  1970  to little over 40  percent 
in  1994.  The decline for  the other two age groups is  less  dramatic, although 
it is  worth  noticing  that,  by  1994,  the labor force  participation  rate of men 
aged 55-59 was down to about 70 per cent, and the negative trend seems to be 
continuing. 
Female LFPR present a  mixed  picture, with  a clear downward trend only 
for  women aged 65+. For the other age groups considered, we  observe a small 
decline in the second half of the 1960s, followed  by a rise in  the first half of the 
1970s, and a subsequent slow decline lasting until the mid  1980s when female 
LFPR start increasing again, at least for women younger than 60. 
Figure 4  shows  the fraction  of workers covered  by  the SS  system.  The 
denominator of the ratio is obtained by  projecting to the population level  the 
employement  rate resulting from  the EPA.  The numerator is  the number of 
workers contributing to the Old  Age  and  Disability Insurance (SOV!) for  the 
4 period 1964-75, and the number of workers affiliated to the SS system (en alta 
laboral)  after 1979.  The data for  the period  1976-79 are not reported because 
they are considered to be of poor quality and fundamentally unreliable. 
In  1964,  only  half of the workers  were  covered  by  mandatory insurance. 
Since  then,  the proportion  covered  has grown  steadily.  This is  due  mainly 
to the progressive integration into the SS  system of a  number of professional 
pensions schemes (Mutualidades), to the legislation of mandatory public pension 
for many categories of self-employed workers, and to the widening of coverage of 
the disability insurance plan.  Historical details are provided in the next section. 
Notice that the number of workers covered by SS has surpassed, in  the most 
recent years, the official employment level.  This provides strong support to the 
view that the EPA grossly underestimates the actual level  of employment (and 
overestimates, consequently,  the level  of unemployment).  For more details on 
this issue see, e.g.  Villagarcia (1995). 
Figure 5 shows the share of population aged 55+ receiving old-age, disabil-
ity,  or some other type of pension.  Data are again from  the EPA, which  asks 
respondents to report their status in  the week  before the survey, distinguish-
ing  between  being retired,  being permanently disabled,  and receiving  another 
pension different from old-age or disability.  The latter category is  particularly 
important for  women, since it includes survivors' pensions.  The upper profile 
indicates the fraction of older men receiving public pensions.  The profile imme-
diately below indicates the fraction of older men receiving old-age or survivors' 
pensions.  The lower profiles correspond to females. 
The figure shows clearly the steady increase in pension recipiency rates. The 
nature and the dynamics of the benefits, however, are quite different between the 
two sexes.  Most men  aged 55+ receive old-age or disability pensions, whereas 
survivors' pensions are by far the most common type of benefit among women. 
5 In  particular, for  the years after 1986, for  which  a reliable  corn parison can be 
made, the growth rate of survivors' pensions among females  greatly outpaces 
the growth  rate of both old-age  and  disability  pensions,  the share of which 
remains rather stable at about 20  percent. 
The difference between the two sexes in  the relative importance of the var-
ious sources of pension income is  readily understood by combining two factors. 
One is  the increased coverage of males by  means of old-age or disability pen-
sions, the other is the longer life expectancy of females which transforms males' 
pensions into females' survivors benefits. 
Although reliable estimates of replacement rates over time are not available, 
we  were  able  to obtain  some  information  using  administrative  records  from 
SS.  The old-age (OA)  and disability  (DJ)  pension  replacement rates presented 
in  Figure 6 are computed  as the ratio between the initial  pension  award and 
the  benefit  base or  base  reguladora  (defined  in  Section  3.4.3)  at the time of 
retirement.  Unti11985, the benefit base is a very good measure of pre-retirement 
earnings, being computed as the average salary over the last two years of work. 
After 1985, it is computed over a longer period of eight years before retirement 
(see below). 
Female old-age pension replacement rates surge to 100 percent in  the early 
seventies.  This is due to the fact that in  the years immediately after the intro-
duction of the current system, pensions were granted to individuals with very 
short work-histories and, simultaneously, pensions were adjusted to their mini-
mum level.  Replacement rates decline rapidly after 1979 as female wages move 
closer to those of men.  After 1986, the female replacement rates become indeed 
lower than the male ones.  In all other cases, the figure shows a steady decline of 
replacement rates over the period considered, which  becomes more pronounced 
after the 198.5 reform (see next section).  Because of the way in  which the initial 
6 pension is computed (see Section 3.3), this phenomenon suggests a continuous 
reduction in  either the number of contributory years, or the age of retirement, 
or both.  The existence of strong incentives to early retirement is, in our view, 
a  critical feature of the Spanish SS  system.  We  will  come back to a detailed 
analysis of this issue in  the last two sections of the paper.  We  will  argue there 
that the main incentive to early retirement comes from the generous mechanism 
determining the minimum pension. 
2.2  Contemporaneous age patterns 
This section focuses on the age range from 45 to 75.  Unless indicated otherwise, 
the data are tabulations based on the pooled  EPAs for the second quarters of 
the years 1993-95. 
These results are consistent with the ones obtained using the 1990-91 House-
hold  Budget Survey (Encuesta de  Presupuestos Familiares or EPF), which we 
do not report. 
Figure 7 compares cross-sectional LFPR by age for men and women. At age 
45,  female  LFPR are less  than 50 percent, about half the ones of men.  After 
that age,  LFPR decline  steadily  with  noticeable differences  between  the two 
sexes.  For women, LFPR decline linearly, with a sizeable jump only at age 65. 
For men, the decline tends instead to accelerate with age, at least until age 65, 
and shows two noticeable jumps at ages 60  and 65. 
Figures 8 and 9 show, for each age, the distribution by  main activity (em-
ployed,  unemployed, disabled and retired) separately by sex.  Overall, the pat-
terns of LFPR are confirmed  but two interesting features appear, common to 
both men and women.  First, the fraction of the population classified as unem-
ployed  declines  rapidly with  age.  Second,  the residual fraction of individuals 
not belonging to any of the previous four categories (not reported in  the Fig-
7 ures)  increases steadily  until  age  65  when  it suddenly  falls.  This downward 
jump is  due to the award of non-contributory old-age pensions to people aged 
65  who were previously out of the labor force or covered by  other welfare pro-
grams (see  below).  After age 65,  there are almost no  men left in  the residual 
category, whereas the fraction of women classified in  this category declines due 
the increase in  the fraction receiving survivors' pensions. 
The next set of pictures are based on  the Spanish household  budget survey 
(Encuesta de  Presupuestos Familiares, or EPF) for  1990.  They are meant to 
assess  the extent to which  transfers from  the SS  system affect the income of 
older men and women. 
Figure 10  shows the fraction  of men  that receive  some form  of public  in-
come at each age.  Public income, identified in  the EPF with welfare payments 
(prestaciones sociales), is  broken down  into three categories:  old-age and sur-
vivors' (OAS)  pensions, disability  (DI)  pensions, and other welfare payments. 
The fraction  of men  receiving  disability  pensions  increases  sharply  right 
before age 65, suggesting a strategic use of this kind  of pensions to anticipate 
retirement and avoid  the cuts that the legislation  would  otherwise impose on 
old-age  pensions.  In  fact,  those who  are declared  disable  can  stop working, 
collect a disability pension immediately, and still  receive their old-age pension 
in  full  once  they  reach  age  65.  For individuals  that have already cumulated 
35  years of work, are younger than 65, belong to SS  regimes that do not allow 
for  early retirement and do not expect any substantial real wage increase, the 
"disabled first - retired later" strategy is clearly a dominant one. 
A precise assessment of the number of those who participate to or receive 
income from private pension schemes is very hard to come by, due to the lack of 
data. Figure 11 reports data from the EPF and gives a breakdown of the sources 
of family  income  (earnings, assets,  private pensions,  and  public  transfers)  by 
8 the age of the (male) family head. The graph suggests the irreleyance of pri\'ate 
pensions.  Notice that the fraction receiving such transfers, beside being almost 
negligible  (less than 3  percent) for  both men  and women,  remains practically 
constant at all  ages. 
3  Institutional features of SS 
3.1  Historical evolution 
Mandatory insurance for job related accidents was introduced in  1900, through 
a bill that also authorized the creation of some funds, for public employees only, 
paying disability and retirement pensions. 
In  1919,  mandatory retirement insurance (Retiro  Obrero  Obligatorio)  was 
introduced for private sector employees aged  16-65 whose total annual salary 
was below  a certain threshold.  Contributions to the fund  came from  both the 
employer and the employee in  a 3 to 1 ratio. 
In  1926, a universal pension system for public employees (Regimen de  Clases 
Pash'as, or RCP) was established, providing a minimum pension and the option 
of contributing. out of the salary and up to a maximum amount, towards a com-
plementary pension.  By the late 1930s, most Spanish employees were covered, 
in  one form  or another,  by  some minimal,  government mandated  retirement 
insurance program. 
With the end of the Republic and the advent of Franco's regime, a  number 
of more or less  connected changes were implemented.  In  1939,  Workers' Re-
tirement (Retiro Obrero)  \'v'as  replaced by Old Age Insurance (Seguro  de  Vejez). 
While the former was based upon a capitalization system, the latter was from 
the beginning a completely unfunded pay-as-you-go scheme.  At the same time, 
the regime promoted the creation of complementary pension funds, called  Mu-
tua/ida(ifs y JIontep[os  Laborales, which were jointly managed by the :t..,finistry 
9 of Labor and the regime-sponsored trade-unions. 
By 1950. the system had acquired its basic organization in two pillars, which 
remained essentially  unchanged  until  the mid  1970s, when the collapse of the 
dictatorial regime brought about major changes.  Public servants were all cov-
ered  by the RCP. while  private sector employees with annual earnings below a 
certain ceiling were covered by the Old Age Insurance.  Both public and private 
employees could also enroll in  complementary pension plans (the Mutualidades) 
which. despite the apparently private nature, were under complete government 
control. 
Variability  in  benefit and tax rates across different professional groups and 
sectors of actiyity  \\'as  not  negligible.  A ceiling  on  covered  earnings was leg-
islated  in  19.50  and  updated  more or less  regularly after that.  For most  Mu-
tualidadEs,  covered earnings were computed as the average annual salary over 
a  period  of 24  consecutive months chosen  by  the retiree within the last seven 
years of work. 
3.2  Major reforms since 1960 
The 1963 Social Security Act (Ley de  Bases de  la  Seguridad Social) eliminated 
the income ceiling for  enrollment in  the Old Age Insurance, unified  the various 
contributions for  retirement, disability, etc., in  a general SS  contribution, and 
modified  the percentages contributed by  the employer and the employee. 
Another consequence of the 1963  reform  was the creation of a  very  large 
number  of special  funds  (Regimenes  Especiales)  next  to the general  scheme 
(Regimen GenEra!). generating ajungJe of special treatments and privileges for 
sectors and categories that were either politically close to the regime, or enjoyed 
the support of a particularly strong trade union. 
The 1963 act also defined i for each professional group and sector of activity, 
10 the tax base (bases de  cotizaci6n)  upon  which  SS  taxes were levied.  Such  tax 
base, hO\\,ever, had little to do with actual earnings.  The difference between the 
t\\·o increased sharply over time until the 1972 reform, which effectively linked 
the tax base to wages (overtime pay excluded). 
Besides linking the tax bases to actual wages, the 1972 bill also loosened sig-
nificantly the eligibility criteria and began undoing the system of Mutualidades 
by establishing common replacement rates in place of the previous system where 
each  category had  its own.  Finally,  it established  the principle that pensions 
should  be indexed  to both the cost of living and the real wage growth. 
In  1977, a reform bill  made a first attempt at harmonizing the many existing 
funds,  by  reducing the differences in  the treatment they offered and by putting 
(in  1979) the administration of the whole system under the newly created Na-
tional  Social  Security  Institute (Instituto Nacional de  la  Seguridad Social,  or 
I\,SS). Overall. t his process increased the percentage of workers covered by the 
public SS  system, as it  is clearly reflected by the aggregate data reported in  the 
previous section. 
The last  major reform  process,  which  came to shape the current regime, 
began  in  1985.  Three important changes were  introduced.  First,  eligibility 
criteria for disability pensions were tightened. Second, the minimum number of 
years of contributions required to obtain an old-age pension was increased from 
8 to 15.  Third, the number of years entering the computation of the benefit 
base was increased from 2 to 8.  The reform also provided for a reduction in  the 
number of existing special funds, either through their integration in  the general 
scheme  or  by  merging  them  together.  This  process,  which  began  in  1986, is 
not  yet  completed,  as  various  small  groups of public  employees  retain  their 
pridleges.  Overall, the 1985 reform had more impact on the replacement rates 
than on  the percentage of covered workers, as the latter had already reached a 
11 very high level. 
In  1986, the Spanish Government established a public health insurance sys-
tem (INSALUD) covering the whole population, which  was largely financed  by 
the contributions to the SS system.  This arrangement ended with the budget 
year  1989,  when  the whole  cost of INSALUD  was  attributed to the general 
Government budget.  A set of regulations for complementary private pension 
plans was introduced in  1987, and further modified in  1995. 
Another important change was the introduction, in 1990, of non-contributory 
pensions for  elderly  people  aged  65+ and for  disabled  people  aged  18+, who 
live in  households with income below a certain minimum and satisfy a residency 
requirement.  Financing of these non-contributory pensions is attributed to the 
general Government budget. 
Finally on June 26, 1997, when this paper was already completed, the Par-
liament introduced a number of changes in  the parameters to be  used  for  the 
computation of benefit  bases and  pensions.  The number of contributive years 
over  which  the benefit  base is  computed will  progressively  increase from  the 
current 8 to 15 between now and 2001.  The formula for the computation of the 
replacement rate Q  (see  below)  has also been  made less  generous, whereas the 
8%  per-year penalty applied  to early retirees between the ages of 60  and 65  is 
reduced to 7%  for those individuals with 40  or more contributive years at the 
time of retirement. 
3.3  The current situation 
Under the current legislation, public contributory pensions are provided by the 
following  programs  . 
•  "General Social Security Scheme"  (Regimen General de  la  Seguridad So-
cial,  or RGSS)  and  "Special  Social  Security  Schemes"  (Reg{menes  Es-
12 peciales de  la  Seguridad Social, or RESS): They cover all  private sector 
employees, self-employed workers and professionals, members of coopera-
tive firms, employees of most pu blic administrations other than the central 
government (e.g. municipalities, local corporations), the clergy, convicted 
individuals  working  while  in  jail,  professional  athlets,  members of the 
Parliament, and unemployed individuals who comply with the minimum 
number of contributory years when reaching 65.  The general and the spe-
cial schemes together covered  12.4 million  workers in  1996, of which  8.7 
million  (70 percent) were covered by RGSS and the remaining 3,7 million 
(30 percent) by the RESS. The latter include five  special schemes set up 
for particular classes of workers: 
1.  Self-employed (Regimen Especial de  Trabajadores Aut6nomos or RETA) , 
covering 2,3 million  workers on  average during 1996. 
2.  Agricultural  workers and  small farmers  (Regimen  Especial Agrario 
or REA), covering about 1,2 million workers in  1996, of which 65 per-
cent are employees and the remaining 35 percent are self-employed. 
3.  Domestic workers (Regimen Especial de Empleados de Hogar or REEH), 
covering 144 thousand individuals in  1996. 
4.  Sailors (Regimen Especial de  Trabajadores del Mar or RETM) , cov-
ering 82 thousand workers in  1996, of which 84 percent are employees 
and the remaining 16 percent are self-employed. 
5.  Coal miners (Regimen Especial de la Mineria del CarbOn or REMC) , 
covering 28  thousand workers in  1996 . 
•  Government employees scheme (Regimen de  Clases Pasivas, or RCP): It 
includes public servants (both military and civil)  currently employed  by 
13 the central government and its local  branches.  It  also  covers,  through 
a  number of small special funds,  all  civil  war veterans and  survivors,  a 
variety of semi-public employees, the victims of terrorist attacks, etc.  The 
number of workers covered by  RCP was 806 thousands in  1994. 
•  "Special  Funds":  This is  a family  of special funds,  remnants of the old 
Mutualidades y Montepios, paying small supplementary pensions and pro-
viding  basic  health  insurance  to certain  groups of civil  servants  (MU-
FACE), military personnel  (ISFAS)  and members of the judiciary system 
(MUCEJU). These pensions complement the basic ones paid by the RCP 
or by  the RGSS. 
•  "Insurance Systems of Regional Governments and Local Administrations": 
These are small programs, covering employees of certain regional govern-
ments or local administrations, and are financed  through transfers from 
the central government. 
•  Finally, there exists a long array of small pension plans, covering employ-
ees  of other institutions  (e.g.  the Bank of Spain,  a  number of formerly 
public banks, many local corporations, special branches of some regional 
government, etc.), which  managed  to maintain  their special  treatments 
despite the process of homogenization started in  the 1980s. 
The legislation  approved  by  Parliament on  June 26,  1997 establishes the 
progressive elimination of all the special regimes by the year 2001.  Aside from 
the pension  scheme for  public  employees  (RCP), the Spanish SS  system will 
then be structured around only  two "schemes"  for the private sector:  one for 
the employees and one for the self-employed. 
14 The number of workers affiliated  to the general scheme increased from  6.7 
million  in  1982  to 8.7  million  in  1996.  As  we  have  argued  already,  a  large 
part of this growth simply reflects the progressive incorporation of a variety of 
previously autonomous funds.  At the same time, the number of people affiliated 
to the special schemes decreased from  3.9 to 3.7 million.  OveraIl,  the number 
of people affiliated to SS  (excluding RCP and the smaIler funds) increased from 
10.6 million  in  1982 to the current 12.4 million. 
Figure 12  shows the distribution  of the affiliated  to SS  (excluding  RCP) 
by  program.  The fraction affiliated  to the general scheme grew from about 63 
percent in  1982 to about 70  percent in  1996,  with  a corresponding decline  of 
the fraction affiliated  to the special schemes.  It is  interesting to notice that all 
special schemes except the self-employed  have lost affiliates.  The decline  has 
often been  dramatic, as in  the case of domestic workers and smaIl farmers. 
3.4  The general scheme 
This section describes the rules governing old-age and survivors' pensions under 
the general scheme (RGSS), the main SS  program in Spain and the benchmark 
for  our simulations.  Many of these  rules  also  apply  to the special  schemes 
(RESS) and the scheme for government employees (RCP). The main differences 
will  be noted below when  we  discuss these other programs. 
3.4.1  Financing 
RGSS  is  a  pure  pay-as-you-go scheme financed  partly by  contributions from 
earnings (about two thirds in  1996) and  partly by  transfers from  the Govern-
ment budget (about one third in  1996). 
Contributions are a fixed  proportion of covered  earnings,  defined  as total 
earnings, excluding payments for  overtime work,  between  a floor  and a ceiling 
that vary by  broadly defined professional category. Currently, eleven categories 
15 are distinguished.  For  the first  seven  of them,  floors  and  ceilings  apply  to 
monthly earnings.  These floors and ceilings are shown in  Table 2 for  the years 
1990 and 1996.  They are approximately equal to, respectively, the professional 
minimum  wage and three times the professional  minimum wage.  For the last 
four categories, floors and ceilings apply to daily earnings and are not reported 
in  the Table. 
As the table shows, a process of slow convergence between floors and ceilings 
and  across categories  is  in  place.  This  process  is  generated  by  asymmetric 
inflation adjustments and an intentional effort to control total expenditures on 
pensions  by  slowing down  the growth  of the higher  ones.  Over  time,  these 
modifications  have substantially weakened  the link  between  covered  earnings 
and lifetime wage and work effort, especially for workers earning relatively high 
wages and salaries. 
SS  tax rates have  fluctuated  over  time,  being  lowered  in  the early  1980s 
and  increased  afterwards.  The current tax rate is  28.3  percent  (it was  29.3 
percent until January 1995), of which 23.6 percent is formally attributed to the 
employer and the remaining 4.7 percent to the employee.  A tax rate of only 14 
percent is  levied  on  most earnings from  overtime work, of which  12 percent is 
paid by  the employer and the remaining 2 percent by  the employee. 
3.4.2  Eligibility 
Entitlement to an old-age pension requires the number of years of contributions 
to be at least 15  (only 8 were required  until  1985), of which  at least 2 within 
the last 8 years immediately before retirement. 
As a general rule,  recipiency is conditional on having reached age 65  and is 
incompatible with income from any employment that requires affiliation to SS. 
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Suppose that the eligibility conditions are met and consider a person aged 65+ 
who retires in  month t after n  ~ 15 years of contributions.  Its initial monthly 
pension Pt  is computed as 
where the benefit base (base  reguladora)  BRt  is  a weighted  average of covered 
monthly earnings Wt-j over a reference period that consists of the last 8 years 
before retirement 
1  (24  96  I) 
BRt = 112  ?: Wt_j + L Wt-j  ;~2~  , 
;=1  ;=25  t  ; 
and It-j is  the consumer price index for the j-th month before retirement. 
The replacement rate O:'n  depends on  the number of years of contribution 
and is  equal to 
{ 
0,  if n < 15, 
O:'n =  .6+ .02 (n-15),  if 15  ~ n < 35, 
1,  if 35  ~ n. 
It may be further adjusted in  the case of early retirement as described in  Sec-
tion 3.4.4. 
A few remarks are in order. First, after 15 years of contributions the pension 
is already equal to 60 percent of the benefit base. After 35 years of contributions 
the pension  is  equal to the benefit base and there is  no direct advantage from 
contributing further, although contributions are mandatory until retirement. 
Second, if there were no inflation and no wage growth in the reference period, 
that is, Wt-j was constant over the last 8 years, then the benefit base would be 
equal to 6/7 =  .857 of the last monthly social security wage.  This is  because 
pensions  (and, usually,  salaries) are paid in  14  monthly installments, whereas 
monthly social security contributions are levied  on  yearly salaries divided  by 
17 12.  For a  person with 35 years of contributions, the annual benefit base would 
then be equal to the last annual wage. 
Third,  earnings in  the last two years before  retirement are not adjusted 
for  inflation.  For earlier  months, they are adjusted and converted to money 
equivalents of the 25-th month before retirement.  In  periods of high  inflation, 
these aspects of the benefit formula imply that the benefit  base may be well 
below the average real wage in  the last 8 years. 
Fourth, beginning July 15,  1997, the number of reference years will  be in-
creased by one every year until 2001 and could then be increased further up to 
15 years.  Moreover, the formula for computing an has also been changed to the 
following 
{ 
0,  if n < 15, 
a  =  .5 + .03 (n - 15),  if 15  ~ n < 25, 
n  .8+ .02 (n- 25),  if 25  ~ n < 35, 
1,  if 35  ~  n. 
In  all of our simulations we obviously used the old formula, which was in  place 
over the relevant sample period. 
3.4.4  Early retirement 
The normal retirement age is 65, but early retirement at age 60 is permitted for 
those who became affiliated to SS  before 1967.  Currently, more than one third 
of those who retire under the general scheme take advantage of this possibility. 
The current legislation distinguishes between two cases.  The first one, rep-
resenting the vast majority of those currently retiring between age 60  and 65 
[Duran (1995), p. 472], is  the case of workers who started contributing as de-
pendent employees to some Mutualidad  Laboral  before 1967.  In  this case, the 
replacement rate is reduced by 8 percentage points for each year under age 65. 
Table 3 shows how replacement rates vary with age and the number of years of 
contribution.  Notice the differentincentive to work an extra year for a  person 
18 aged  60  and one aged  65,  both with 34  years of contributions.  In  the former 
case, the pension increases from 56.8 to 68  percent of the benefit base, while in 
the latter it only increases from  98  to 100  percent.  As of July 15, 1997 work-
ers who retires after the age of 60  with  40  or more contributive years will  be 
charged a penalty of only 7 percent for each year under age 65. 
The second case, representing about 10  percent of the early retirees, is  the 
case of workers with dangerous or unhealthy jobs (e.g.  bullfighters,  employees 
of railroads, public transportation companies and airlines, etc.), or workers who 
were laid off for industrial restructuring regulated by special legislation.  In this 
case,  no  reduction applies.  Notice that these exemption rights are "portable", 
as  the minimum  retirement  age  without  penalty,  for  an  individual  who  was 
previously  employed  in  one of the sectors deemed  dangerous or unhealthy,  is 
reduced in  proportion to the number of years of work spent in  such sectors. 
Unless there are collective agreements that prescribe mandatory retirement, 
individuals may continue working after age 65.  There is  no direct incentive for 
delaying  retirement,  however,  at least for  those individuals who  have already 
reached  35  years  of contribution  at the  age  of 65.  The only  indirect  form 
of incentive  would  be  the prospect of a  particularly high  wage growth in  the 
forthcoming years, as this would proportionally increase the benefit base (recall 
that only the last 8 years of wages are taken into account in  this computation). 
For those with  less  than 35  years of contribution, a small  direct incentive  to 
postpone retirement is provided  by the fact that the ratio of the pension to the 
benefit base grows 2 percentage points per year of contribution until reaching 
100 percent. 
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Pensions are subject to a ceiling legislated  annually and  roughly equal to the 
ceiling on  covered earnings.  The 1996 ceiling  corresponds to about 4.3  times 
the minimum  wage  (salario  minimo interprofesional, or SMI)  and  about 1.6 
times the average monthly earnings in  the manufacturing and service sectors. 
If the computed old-age  pension  is  below  a  minimum,  then a  person  is  paid 
a  minimum  pension  legislated  annually.  Minimum  and  maximum  pensions, 
as well  as the annualized  SMI,  are  reported  in  Table  4.  Other things  being 
equal, minimum pensions are higher for  those who are older than 65 or have a 
dependent spouse. 
In  the last decade, minimum pensions grew at about the same rate as nomi-
nal wages, whereas maximum pensions grew at a lower rate that is about equal 
to the inflation  rate.  The ratio  between  the  minimum  old-age  pension  and 
the minimum wage has been increasing steadily from  the late 1970s (it was 75 
percent in  1975)  until reaching almost 100 percent in  the early 1990s.  On  the 
other hand, the percentage of pensioners of the general scheme  receiving  the 
minimum pension has been declining steadily, from over 75  percent in  the late 
1970s to 27  percent in  1995. 
In  Figure  13  we  analyze  the  relative  importance of complements  to the 
minimum,  that is,  the difference  between the actual pension  amount and  the 
"virtual"  pension in  the absence of minimum  pension  rules.  The sample, from 
administrative SS records as of January 1993, includes people who retired before 
1985 with only 8 years of contributions. 
The fraction of the total pension which comes from complements varies with 
the pension type.  It is  10.1 percent for  men and 12.5 percent for women in  the 
case of old-age pensions, 5.8 and 6.2 percent respectively in  the case of disability 
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the fraction  of pensioners who  receive complements to the minimum  and  the 
share of the pension due to complements both decrease with the number of years 
of contribution.  For example, people who retire with  10 years of contributions 
get 40  percent of their pension  from  complements,  whereas people who  retire 
with 35 years get less than 10 percent from complements. 
It is interesting to note that both indices are higher for men than for women 
for  longer contributory lives.  This result has to be interpreted with care, how-
ever, since there are very few  women  (less than 10  percent) among pensioners 
who  contributed  for  35  years or more,  whereas  they  represent  the majority 
among pensioners who contributed for  15 years or less. 
3.4.6  Pension indexation 
Pensions  are fully  indexed  to inflation,  as  measured  by  the Consumer  Price 
Index  (In  dice  de  precios de  consumo, or IPC). Until  1986,  pensions were  also 
indexed  to real  wage growth. 
It should  be  noted that indexation  is  to expected inflation,  as defined  an-
nually  by  the Central Bank and  the Treasury.  If actual inflation  is  above the 
expected one, then the difference is paid only to the pensions that are below the 
minimum wage.  No adjustment is  made, however, if actual inflation falls below 
the expected one, as it occurred during the last two years.  Pensions that have 
already  reached  the legislated  ceiling  are  not indexed  but are  automatically 
adjusted with the ceiling. 
While th;s indexation mechanism could, at least theoretically, induce large 
reductions in the real value of higher pensions and a strong tendency to pension 
equalization, in  practice this has occurred only to a limited extent. 
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A  pensioner  receives  a  fixed  annual  allowance  for  each  dependent child  that 
is  younger than 18 or disabled.  In  1996,  this allowance was equal to 408,840 
pesetas (pta), corresponding to about 45  percent of the annualized  minimum 
wage.  In  addition, the minimum  pension  is  increased  by  a fixed  amount if a 
pensioner has a dependent spouse (Table 4). 
Survivors  (spouse,  children,  other relatives)  may receive  a  fraction  of the 
benefit base of the deceased if the latter was a pensioner or died  before retire-
ment after contributing for at least 500 days in  the last 5 years.  The benefit 
base is computed differently in  the two cases.  If the deceased was a pensioner, 
the benefit  base coincides  with the pension.  If the deceased  was a  worker, it 
is  computed as an average of covered earnings over an  uninterrupted period of 
2 years chosen  by  the beneficiary  among the last 7 years immediately  before 
death.  If death occurred  because of a  work accident or a  professional illness, 
then the benefit base coincides with last earnings. 
The surviving spouse gets 45  percent of the benefit base of the deceased.  In 
case of divorce, the pension is divided  between the various spouses according to 
the length of their marriage with the deceased.  Such  a  pension  is  compatible 
with labor income and any other old-age or disability pension, but is lost if the 
spouse remarries.  As a token of curiosity, we point out here that the remarriage 
rate among spanish widows is  particularly low compared to other countries. 
Surviving children  get 20  percent each of the benefit base of the principal 
as long as they are less than 18 or unable to work, and stay unmarried.  A full 
orphan who is  a sole  beneficiary  may  receive  up to 65  percent of the benefit 
base.  If there are several surviving children,  the sum  of the pensions to the 
surviving spouse (if any) and children cannot exceed 100 percent of the benefit 
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A Spanish  peculiarity  is  the "pension  in  favor of family  members".  This 
pension entitles other  surviving relatives  (e.g.  parents, grandparents, siblings, 
nephews, etc.)  to 20  percent of the benefit base of the principal if they satisfy 
certain eligibility conditions (older than 45, do not have a spouse, do not have 
other means of subsistence, have been living with and depending economically 
upon the deceased for the last two years).  To this pension, one may add the 45 
percent survivors' pension  if there is  no surviving spouse or eligible surviving 
children. 
There are specific minimum pensions for the different types of survivorship. 
In  particular, the minimum  pension  to a surviving spouse has been  raised  in 
1992 and is  now equal to the minimum old-age pension for a person without a 
dependent spouse. 
3.5  Special schemes 
In this section we sketch the main differences between the general and the special 
schemes.  Whereas rules  and  regulations for  sailors and  coal  miners  are very 
similar to the ones for the general scheme, special rules apply to self-employed, 
farmers,  agricultural  workers,  domestic servants,  and  a  few  other categories 
not discussed  here,  such  as  part-time workers,  artists,  traveling salespeople, 
and  bullfighters.  Beside  differences  in  the SS  tax rate and  the definition  of 
covered  earnings, an important difference is  the fact that the affiliated to the 
special schemes have no early retirement option (exception made for miners and 
sailors). 
The rest of this section  focuses  on  the special  schemes for  self-employed 
workers (RETA) and for  farmers  (REA), which  together represent 93  percent 
of the affiliated to the special schemes and 86 percent of the pensions that they 
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3.5.1  Self-employed 
While the SS  tax rate is the same for  the RETA and the general scheme (28.3 
percent in 1996), covered earnings are computed differently, as the self-employed 
are essentially free to choose their covered earnings between a floor and a ceiling 
legislated  annually.  Not surprisingly in  the light of the strong progressivity of 
Spanish personal income taxes, a suspiciously large proportion of self-employed 
workers report earnings equal to the legislated floor. 
In  1996, the floor and the ceiling were equal to 101,940 pta and 374,880 pta 
per month respectively, corresponding to 1.6 and 5.8 times the minimum wage, 
and  .5  and  1.9 times the average earnings in  manufacturing and services.  For 
a self-employed aged 50+, the ceiling was only about half, namely 195,000 pta 
per month, which  was about equal to the average monthly earnings. 
A crucial difference  with  respect  to the general  scheme is  that, under the 
RETA, recipiency of an old-age pension is compatible with maintaining the self-
employed  status.  This provision  effectively  configures the RETA  pensions as 
pure old-age pensions, completely independent from labor market participation 
decisions. 
Some other important provisions are the following.  RETA only requires at 
least 5 years of contribution in  the 10 years immediately before the death of the 
principal  in  order to qualify  for  survivors' pensions.  Under RETA, the latter 
is  50  percent of the benefit base.  If the principal was not a pensioner at time 
of death, the benefit base is computed as the average of covereJ earnings over 
an uninterrupted period of 5 years chosen by the beneficiary among the last 10 
years before the death of the principal. 
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In  this case, both the SS  tax rate and the covered earnings differ with respect 
to the general  scheme~ Self-employed farmers pay 18.75 percent of a tax base 
that is legislated annually and is unrelated to actual earnings.  In  1996, this was 
equal to 80,490 pta per month, corresponding to 1.24 times the minimum wage 
and about 40  percent the average monthly earnings in  the manufacturing and 
service sectors. 
Farm employees, instead, pay 11.5 percent of a monthly base that depends 
on  their professional category and is legislated yearly.  In  addition, for each day 
of work,  their employer must pay 15.5 percent of a daily  base that also varies 
by  professional category and is legislated annually. 
3.6  Government employees 
We  now  describe  briefly  the main differences  between  the general scheme and 
the RCP, the pension fund  for  the employees of the central government. 
Public servants are divided  into 5 categories,  labeled  from  A to E, corre-
sponding loosely to decreasing schooling levels:  A for college grad uates (doctor, 
licenciado,  arquitecto  0  equivalente), B for  people holding certain kinds of col-
lege diplomas (ingeniero tecnico,  diplomado,  etc.)' C for  high school graduates 
(bachiller  0  equivalente), D for junior high  school diplomas  (graduado  escolar 
o equivalente), and E for individ uals with lower ed ucation levels (certificado de 
escolaridad).  There were  many more categories before  the 1985  reform.  For 
each of these categories, the budget law defines every year a theoretical SS wage 
(haber regulador) which is used to compute SS contributions and pensions.  The 
implied  wage scale has remained  relatively constant since 1985.  So, for  exam-
ple,  the ratio of level  A to level  E wages was equal to 2.39  between  1985 and 
1989, dropped to 2.33 in  1990, and rebounced  and remained constant at 2.45 
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SS  contributions are the sum of three parts, each  proportional to the leg-
islated covered wage,  according to proportionality factors legislated  annually: 
a)  derechos pasivos (3.86 percent in  1995), b)  cuota mensual de  Mutualidades 
(1.89 percent in 1995), and c)  aportacion del Estado (paid by the government, it 
varies between 6 and 10 percent depending on the sector of the administration). 
To parallel this three-part contribution structure, actual pensions are com-
puted  by  adding up  three sources of benefits:  a)  the basic  pension  (derechos 
pasivos), b)  a portion directed to the pensioner's family  (ayuda familiar), and 
c)  a  complementary  portion coming  from  the various  Mutualidades  (ISFAS, 
MUFACE, MUGEJU). 
The basic  monthly pension  of a  public servant who  retires in  month t  af-
ter contributing for  n years to RCP  is  computed as  Pt  =  an BRt ,  where the 
dependence of an upon  the numbers of years worked  has been  changed quite 
frequently during the last 10 years.  For n ~ 15, the last table of proportionality 
factors,  legislated  in  1990, can be  reasonably  (but not exactly)  approximated 
by 
an =  min(l, 1 - .0366 (35 - n)). 
The differences with respect to the general scheme are various.  First, while 
the entitlement to a  pension  still  requires  at least 15  years of contributions, 
the replacement  rate (the ratio of the pension  to the benefit  base)  increases 
somewhat irregularly with seniority,  up to 100  percent after 35  years.  So, for 
example, 15 years of service give right to a pension equal to only 26.92 percent 
of the benefit base, against 60 percent of the general scheme.  After 30 years the 
same ratio has increased  to 81.73 percent, against 90  percent for  the general 
scheme).  Historically, this replacement ratio has been rather unstable as it can 
26 be modified year-by-year through the budget law. 
Second, the benefit base is computed as a weighted average of covered earn-
ings,  upon which  the worker paid the contributions, with weights equal to the 
percentage of the career spent at each level, that is, 
where Pi is  the fraction of the career spent on  level  i  and  Hit are the covered 
earnings corresponding to level  i, as determined  by the current law at time t. 
Third, unlike the general scheme, the Rep imposes mandatory retirement 
at age 65.  Exception are made for a few  special  categories, such  as university 
professors and judges. On the other hand, the Rep allows for early retirement 
at the age of 60, without any penalty for public servants with at least 30 years 
of service  (20 for  military personnel). 
A fourth important difference with respect to the general scheme is compat-
ibility between Rep pensions recipiency  and  income from continuing to work. 
In  a number of special cases, Rep pensioners are allowed  to keep a public sec-
tor occupation, as long as this does not  provide them with  a  "regular flow  of 
income"  (for example, this is the case of members of legislative bodies).  More 
importantly, the legislation allows Rep pensions to be cumulated with earnings 
from employment in  the private sector. 
It should  be  noted  that those who  leave  the  public  administration  after 
contributing the minimum number of years but before reaching the retirement 
age, can claim an Rep pension once they reach age 65.  The benefit base used 
to compute such pension does not refer to the time when the individual left the 
pu blic  administration but is  instead the one legislated for the year when  they 
turn 65.  Furthermore, any future modification in  the law will  have no impact 
upon  the  pensions  which  are already being  paid.  The latter will  be  forever 
27 regulated by  the legislation of the time when  the individual matured the right 
to the RCP pension. 
When a public servant is dismissed because of disability (and therefore starts 
drawing a disability  pension)  or dies  (and the survivors are therefore entitled 
to a  pension),  the missing years between  the person's age at the time of the 
event and 65 are counted as actual years of service in  the computation of either 
the disability or the survivors' pension.  Should the disability be caused by  an 
accident while on duty, the disability pension is doubled. 
3.7  Disability pensions 
The SS  system provides insurance against both temporary and permanent ill-
ness or disability. 
3.7.1  Temporary illness or disability 
The su bsidy for temporary illness or disability (incapacidad laboral transitoria) 
was not regulated by the 1985 reform, and its terms of provision have undergone 
frequent changes. 
Eligibility  requires affiliation  to the SS  system for  a minimum  period that 
depends upon the nature of the covered risk.  Common illness requires only 180 
days of contributions during the last 5 years,  paid  maternity/paternity leave 
requires at least 9 months before the date of delivery and 180 days during the 
last 12  months, whereas no  minimum eligibility criterion is  imposed for  work-
related accidents or illnesses. 
The benefit base depends on actual earnings during the last 12 months. In 
case of common illness or work-unrelated accident, the subsidy is  equal to 60 
percent of the benefit  base for  each  day of absence between the 4-th and the 
20-th,  and to 75  percent of the benefit  base aftwerwards until  the maximum 
period  is  reached.  It is  always  equal  to  75  percent  in  case  of work-related 
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being  allowed  to use  the subsidy  per each  child).  The maximum  period  for 
which  the subsidy can  be  received  is  18  months, after which  the worker has 
either to return to work or be classified  as "permanently disabled" . 
3.7.2  Contributive disability pensions 
Permanent disability pensions have played an important role in  allowing Span-
ish  workers to retire at ages earlier than 60.  In  particular, they have been used 
extensively during the late 1970s and early 1980s as an early-retirement mech-
anism for workers in  restructuring industries (shipbuilding, steel, mining, etc.), 
or as  substitutes for .long-term  unemployment subsidies  in  depressed  regions. 
The total disability rate (as a percentage of the workforce) doubled in less than 
ten  years,  from  about 0.7  percent in  1975  to 1.5  percent in  1983.  The 1985 
reform, by  tightening the requirements, managed to bring the phenomenon un-
der partial control. Disability rates have since decreased, stabilizing around 0.6 
percent. 
Disability pensions are distinguished into contributory and non-contributory. 
This section deals with the contributory pensions.  The non-contributory ones 
are dealt with in  the next section. 
Eligibility and pension amounts depend on the level  of disability.  The 1985 
reform  distinguished  four  levels  of permanent disability  characterized  by  in-
creasing  severity.  Since  then,  the  legislation  has  formally  reduced  them  to 
three, but has also created a special subcase of the first level  with the explicit 
purpose of using the disability funds to subsidize  the dismissal of old  workers 
from certain sectors or geographic areas. 
The first level  (incapacidad permanente total para  la  profesi6n habitual, or 
IPT) corresponds to inability to do the usual job. A special subcase (incapaci-
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only to employees older than 55  which  are in  particular socio-economic situa-
tions.  The second level  (incapacidad permanente absoluta, or IPA) corresponds 
to inability to do any kind  of job.  The third level  (gran  invalidez, or GI)  re-
quires, in  addition, continued attendance by other persons in order to carry out 
the basic vital functions. 
When  disability  is  caused  by  an  ordinary illness,  eligibility  to a  pension 
requires from  5 to 15  years of contributions, depending on  the age when  the 
person  fell  ill  and  the seriousness  of the disability.  There is  no  contributive 
requirement when the disability is caused by an accident, whether or not work-
related, or a professional illness. 
Eligibility  requirements are fairly  complicated.  We  try here  to streamline 
their presentantion.  In  the cases of IPA  or GI,  15  years of contributions are 
required, of which  at least 3 during the last 10 years.  For the other two cases 
(IPT and IPTC), eligibility depends on  age.  For persons aged  26  or younger, 
the requirement is  half of the number of years between the age of 16  and the 
age when disability began.  For persons older than 26, the requirement is either 
5 years or a fourth of the number of years between the age of 20  and the age 
when disability began, whichever is  largest. Furthermore, at least a fifth of the 
required contributory years must have occurred during the last 10 years. 
The benefit  base depends on  the source of disability.  In  case of ordinary 
illness, it is computed as for old-age pensions.  For work-unrelated accident, it is 
the average annual wage over a period of 24 consecutive months chosen by the 
person within the last 7 years of work.  For work-related accident or professional 
illness, it is the average wage in the last year of work. 
The pension equals 55 percent of the benefit base under IPT, and increases 
to 7·5  percent under IPTe. In case of IPA, it is equal to 100 of the benefit base, 
30 whereas for GI it is  equal to 100  percent of the benefit  base  plus  another ·)0 
percent covering the person taking care of the disabled. 
Disability pensions are indexed  to inflation  like  the other pensions of the 
RGSS. Unlike the latter, however, disability pensions may be kept while earn-
ing income from  a job different from  the one for  which  the disability  (even  a 
complete one) was determined. 
We mentioned earlier that disability pensions were awarded very generously 
until  1985.  This is  illustrated  in  Figure 14,  which  reports the distribution  of 
male disability pensions outstanding in  1993, by  age and year of award, based 
on  administrative records from  SS.  For all  age groups,  awards peak  between 
1980 and  1982, when  the growth rate of the number of outstanding disability 
pensions reached 6 percent a year.  Between 20 and 25 percent of the outstanding 
disability  pensions  were  granted during  those years which  correspond  to the 
most severe  post-war recession  in  the Spanish  economy.  For  women,  a  very 
similar picture is obtained. 
The extent to which disability pensions may have been  used as instruments 
to absorb the reduction of employment in certain sectors of the Spanish economy 
is evident in  Table 5 which  reports the percentage ratio between the number of 
disability pensions paid  and the number of workers covered  by  the various SS 
programs for the years between 1981  and 1994. 
While  certain  sectors  are clearly  characterized  by  a  higher  risk  of work 
related  accidents,  this fact cannot explain  the persistently  higher  percentage 
of disabled  among the domestic  or  the agricultural  workers,  nor  the strong 
countercyclical pattern of the disability ratios reported. 
A second  interesting element is  the age distribution of the ne\v  recipients 
of disability pensions.  In  1994, for example, the average age of ne\v  recipients 
was of 51.7 years on average, with a  value of 50  for  the RGSS and of .5-! ..  5.5.6 
31 and 57.9 respectively for  RETA, REA and REEH. Table 6 shows, for each SS 
program  and  each  level  of disability,  the fraction  of new  disability  pensions 
awarded in  1994 to individuals aged 55+. 
Criteria are now much stricter, although Court rulings often recognize claims 
to a  pension  that have  been  rejected  by  the SS  administration.  At least  in 
principle,  a  person  receiving  a disability  pension  may  be subject to periodic 
checks in  order to determine whether the conditions for a pension are still met. 
3.7.3  N on-contributory disability pensions 
They are granted, through a special  branch of the SS  system called  Instituto 
Nacional de  Servicios Sociales  (INSERSO), to disabled  people  aged  18  to 65 
who are ineligible for contributory pensions, have been legal residents of Spain 
for  at least 5 years  (of which  at least 2 immediately before applying for  such 
pension),  and  whose  annual income  is  below  a certain  threshold.  INSERSO 
also  provides its beneficiaries with basic health insurance, free  medicines,  and 
other complementary social services. 
In  1990,  a  number of pre-existing  non-contributory  programs were  ratio-
nalized  and  unified  under  INSERSO.  As  of 1995,  the total annual  budget of 
INSERSO  was 418  billions  pta, of which  64  percent were direct  Government 
transfers while  the rest was  financed  through SS  contributions.  Just to give 
an  idea of the relative magnitude of this program, which  represents about 0.7 
percent of Spanish GDP, notice that total expenditures for the public university 
system in  1995 was only slightly higher, at about 0.9 percent of GDP. 
Of the total annual  budget  of INSERSO  in  1995,  about 39  percent  was 
spent either in  direct  monetary transfers or services  to disabled  individuals, 
about the same amount went to non-contributory old-age pensions  (see  next 
section), 20 percent was transferred to the regional governments (Comunidades 
32 A utonomas)  providing similar services,  and  2 percent covered  INSERSO  ad-
ministrative costs. 
The basic annual disability pension  paid  by  INSERSO in  1996 was 498,120 
pta, corresponding to 55  percent of the minimum  wage  (SMI)  and  19  percent 
of average  monthly earnings during  the same year.  Such  amount may  vary 
according to the economic and  physical  conditions of the individual  and  may 
be increased up to 50 percent. 
At  the end  of 1995,  there  were  about  163  thousands  recipients  of non-
contributory disability  pensions  residing  in  Spain,  of which  36  percent  were 
males and 64 percent females.  Another 198 thousands people (22 percent males 
and 78 percent females)  received one of three other monetary subsidies also ad-
ministered  by INSERSO. 
3.8  Other transfer programs 
We  now describe a few  other transfer programs that are either conditioned on 
age, or for which  the elderly can qualify based solely on  having low  incomes. 
3.B.1  Unemployment benefits 
There exists a special  subsidy for  unemployed  people that are older than 52, 
lack income sources, have contributed to unemployment insurance for at least 
6 years in  their life  and, except for age, satisfy all  requirements for an old-age 
pension.  This subsidy  pays up to 75  percent of the minimum  wage and  may 
be  received  until  the person  reaches  the age  at which  it  can  access  an  old-
age pension.  Years spent unemployed  count as contributive years towards an 
old-age pension. 
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A person aged 65+ who does not qualify for an old-age pension, is  entitled to 
a  non-contributory  pension  (pension  de  jubilaci6n  no  contributiva)  if he/she 
has  been  a  legal  resident  of Spain  for  the last 10  years  and  his/her annual 
income  is  below  a  certain  threshold.  This  program  is  also  administered  by 
INSERSO. Recipiency of such a pension guarantees recipiency of public health 
care assistance and other benefits available to SS  pensioners. 
The annual pension amount is equal to the minimum income threshold and 
both depend on  whether the person lives with others or not.  If the person does 
not live  with others, then the pension  is  equal to the basic amount paid out 
by INSERSO to disabled individuals.  If the person lives with others, then the 
pension amount varies with the number of household members. 
At the end  of 1995, 186 thousands people received  a non-contributory old-
age  pension  from  INSERSO.  Of these,  14  percent were males and  86  percent 
females. 
3.8.3  Other programs run by INSERSO 
In addition to its duties in the field  of disability and old-age pensions, INSERSO 
runs a variety of other programs aimed  at the elderly  population.  These pro-
grams include creating and maintaining residential  and day-care centers open 
to retirees aged 60+ and their spouses, and managing the "Social Thermal Pro-
gram" (Programa de  Termalismo Social) and the "Program for Elderly People's 
Holidays"  (Programa  de  Vacaciones  Tercera  Edad).  The latter two programs 
offer paid or subsidized vacations to pensioners or people aged 65+, as well  as 
paid  or subsidized  stays at spas and  thermal resorts within  the country.  The 
spouse of an eligible  person is  also covered by the program. 
Recently,  most regional governments have also begun to provide a number 
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of public transportation, special medical and psychological care, special houses 
for the elderly, etc. 
3.9  Private pensions 
Private pension coverage is voluntary but not very widespread. Yet, the number 
of participants to private pension  plans has more than doubled in  the last few 
years, from  628 thousands in  1990 to 1,525 thousands in  1994 [de  las Fuentes 
and Gonzalo (1996), p. 255).  Assets of private pension funds still represent only 
a small but growing fraction of GDP, estimated to be  4.7 percent in  1997 [de 
las Fuentes and Gonzalo (1996), p.  251]. 
The main  incentive  to participation  is  tax deferral.  Contributions can  be 
entirely deducted from taxable income up to a maximum (equal to 1 million pta 
in  1996, corresponding to 1.1  times the annualized  minimum  wage), provided 
that they do not exceed  15  percent of total annual income.  Upon  recipiency, 
pension  benefits are treated as regular components of labor income and taxed 
accordingly. 
There are three forms of organization of a  private pension  plan.  The first 
(sistema  asociado), open to all  members of the association that promotes the 
plan  (e.g. a trade union), is  rather rare.  The second (sistema de  empleo), open 
to all  employees of the firm  that promotes the plan, is  confined to a few  large 
firms, mainly publicly owned, in  the banking and electricity sectors. The third 
(sistema individual) is open to everybody and is the predominant one, covering 
about 85  percent of the participants to private pension plans. 
3.10  Rights of older workers 
Only public sector employees are subject to mandatory retirement. The manda-
tory retirement age is  normally 65, but it can be  earlier for certain categories 
35 (military,  police,  etc.).  There is  no  mandatory retirement in  the private sec-
tor, unless it is specifically contemplated by collective agreements, which occurs 
rarely. 
In  principle,  age discrimination is prohibited by the law.  Indeed, a govern-
ment attempt of introducing mandatory retirement at age 69  was rejected by 
the Spanish Supreme Court on  the ground that it would  represent a form of 
age discrimination that violates constitutional principles. 
4  Retirement incentives under the SS system 
Vve  now  present the results of calculations carried out to evaluate the retire-
ment incentives provided  by  the Spanish SS  system.  These calculations  refer 
only to the general scheme.  We exclude disability insurance because of two rea-
sons.  First, it is  now  more severely screened than during the 1980's.  Second, 
the extent to which  it is  used  as  an  early  retirement device  follows  political 
criteria that vary greatly between regions and sectors and cannot be properly 
formalized.  Private pensions  are also  excluded,  since  they are voluntary and 
only cover a very small fraction of the workforce. 
Replacement rates are net of SS  contributions and personal income taxes. 
Although  there  is  no  difference  in  the tax treatment of labor earnings  and 
pensions, our simulations take into account the effects of the highly progressive 
nature of the Spanish tax system.  This does not affect the qualitative picture, 
but it has a sizeable  impact upon  the final  magnitudes.  In  order to provide 
the reader with a clearer picture of the powerful role that, over and above the 
pension system, a very progressive income tax schedule may play in determining 
labor supply decisions, we  also report simulation results gross of income taxes 
for some of the most significant cases. 
Exact calculations of the after-tax wealth and  replacement rates are com-
36 plicated  by  the fact that the number of bend  points in  the Spanish  marginal 
tax schedule is  high  (34  in  1985  and still  17  in  1995).  As  an  approximation, 
we  proceeded as follows.  We  first used  the 1995 tax schedule to trace out the 
relationship between average tax rate (net of standard deductions) and income 
(net of SS  contributions paid  by  a worker).  We  then fitted  by  least squares a 
fourth-order polynomial to this relationship.  Finally, the estimated coefficients 
were used  to determine after-tax income for all  previous and subsequent years. 
4.1  Base case 
Our base case  is  a  male  employee,  born  on  January 1,  1930,  who  has  been 
contributing to SS without interruption since he turned 20, on January 1, 1950. 
He  reaches the early retirement age of 60  in  1990  and the normal  retirement 
age of 65  in  1995.  He  is  married to a woman who is  three year younger and 
never worked.  They have no dependent children and their conditional survival 
probabilities at each age are equal to the ones obtained by the latest mortality 
tables published  by  the National Statistical Institute (INE)  with  reference  to 
the year 1990.  We  assume that the survival  probabilities of the husband  and 
the wife  are independent. 
Our base-case  worker  has  a  real  discount  rate of 3  percent  and  his  age-
earnings  profile  has  been  constructed  as  follows.  First,  using  the EPF for 
1980-81, we  computed  median  annual earnings in  1980  for  a  full-time,  non-
agricultural male employee born in  1930.  We then predicted annual earnings in 
all other years using the annual growth rate of nominal earnings, as computed 
by the INSS. After 1995, we  assumed an annual growth rate of nominal wages 
of 4.5 percent and an annual inflation rate of 3 percent. These assumptions are 
in  line with the main macroeconomic scenarios summarized in  Herce (1997). 
Simulations start in  year  1985,  when  our base-case  worker  turns 55  and 
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year 2000.  At age 55,  his  benefit base is  already equal  to 100  percent of the 
average wage during the last eight years of work.  For the period between 1985 
and 1996, we use the historical data for all the relevant SS parameters. For the 
subsequent years, SS  tax rates are assumed  to remain constant at their 1996 
level, the pension is assumed to be perfectly indexed to price inflation, whereas 
the floors  and  ceilings  on  earnings,  as  well  as  the  minimum  and  maximum 
pensions, are assumed to grow at the same rate as nominal wages. 
Our basic hypotheses are the following.  First, if the worker stops working 
before  age  60,  then  he  elects  to begin  receiving  his  old-age  pension  at  age 
60,  which  is  the earliest possible,  whereas if he  stops working past the age of 
60,  then  he  starts receiving  his  old-age  pension  immediately.  Second,  if  he 
stops working  before  age  60,  then  he  receives  no  benefits  or  unemployment 
compensations in  the interim years until  he  starts drawing a  pension.  Third, 
the wealth calculations are all  net present values as of January 1,  1995. 
It may be  worth summarizing the main  qualitative effects of working one 
more year beyond age 60 in  the simulations that we are about to present. 
1.  It may  increase  SS  benefits  by  increasing  the  benefit  base  BRt  or  the 
replacement  rate  Q n  (see  Section  3.4.3).  The benefit  base  increases  if 
earnings from the extra year of work exceed  average earnings during the 
last 8 years. The replacement rate increases if the worker has contributed 
for less than 35 years, in  which case an  extra year of work buys an extra 
2 percent of the benefit base.  If the worker has already contributed for  35 
years, as in  the base case, only the effect on  the benefit base is  relevant. 
2.  It reduces the penalty for early retirement by  8 percentage points. 
3.  It reduces  by  one year the expected  period over which  the worker will 
38 receive a pension. 
4.  It implies paying additional SS contributions. 
5.  The marginal tax rate on  labor income may turn out to be higher than 
the marginal tax rate on  pension income, due to the high progressivity of 
the Spanish income tax schedule.  This effect is likely to be important for 
workers that are in  the higher portion of the earnings distribution. 
Table 7 presents our calculations of replacement  rates,  SS  wealth  (SSW), 
SSW accrual  (the changes in  SSW with  respect to one year earlier), SSW  ac-
crual  rates (the rates of change in  SSW), projected earnings, and  the implicit 
tax/subsidy rates on continuing to work  (minus the ratio between SSW accrual 
and  projected  earnings)  at each  age  between  54  and  69.  Both earnings  and 
SSW wealth  are net of personal income taxes and  are expressed  in  thousands 
pta at 1995 prices. 
SSW starts up at 11.3  million  pta (about $87,000),  but it loses  about 15 
percent of its value  between age 54  and  age 59  because the growth of median 
wages during the period  1986-90  has not  been  enough  to compensate for  the 
additional  contributions paid.  SSW  rises  again  between  age  59  and  age 63, 
mainly because of the progressive reduction in the penalty for earlier retirement 
(effect  (2)), but falls  very rapidly  after age 64,  when  additional years of work 
add nothing to the expected  pension amount while effects (3)-(4) become very 
strong.  As a result of this, the implicit tax rate on  continuing work increases 
rapidly between age 54 and age 58 t  when it reaches 36 percent. It turns negative 
(subsidy) between ages 60  and 62 as the penalty associated to early retirement 
is  progressively reduced.  The net tax or subsidy is  almost zero at age 63, but 
becomes again positive (tax) and rapidly increasing afterwards. 
Notice that the net  replacement  rate increases from  about 60  percent  at 
39 age 59  to about 100  percent at age 65,  and declines slightly  afterwards.  Also 
notice that SSW reaches its maximum value at age 54, long before the worker 
is  allowed to retire. 
4.2  Other cases 
Table 8 presents the incentive calculations for the case of a single worker.  The 
main difference with respect to the base case is that the household he represents 
(missing  a  female  spouse)  has smaller effective survival  probabilities  at each 
age, resulting in  a lower SSW. The age profile of tax/su  bsidy rates is  not very 
different from the base case, except for the fact that there is hardly any su bsidy 
for continuing work between age 60 and age 63.  In other words the reduction in 
the expected length of time over which  pension  benefits will  be  received  (effect 
(3))  and the higher  marginal tax rates on  earnings completely  wash out with 
the increase in  the benefit base brought about by  effects  (1)  and  (2).  Also  in 
this case, SSW is  maximized at age 54. 
Table 9 presents the incentive  calculations for  the case of a  median  wage 
profile with  "incomplete" earnings history.  This worker started working at age 
30,  so that he  does  not fully  qualify  for  a  pension  until  he  reaches  age 65  in 
1995.  The high  tax rate on  continuing workg at all  ages  between  55  and  59 
is counter-intuitive but it helps illustrating the dramatic importance of a sixth 
effect embedded in  the Spanish SS  system, the "minimum pension effect". 
If the worker stops working at age 55, with only  25  years of contributions, 
the pension  that he  will  receive  after turning 60  will  be low  and hit the lower 
bour~d on pensions when  he  reaches age 64.  Since minimum pensions grow  at 
the same rate as  nominal  wages,  there is  no  advantage in  working one extra 
year in  order to raise the initial  pension,  as the latter is  in  any case low  and 
going to be equal to the minimum  pension after just a few  years.  Notice that 
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turns 60.  In  this case, as shown in  Table 3,  working one extra year till  age 61 
would  increase his pension from  54 to 62.6 percent of the benefit base. 
Table 10 differs from  the base case because we  used  the 10th percentile of 
annual earnings as our 1980 anchor.  Given the 1980 anchor, annual earnings for 
all other years are predicted as in  the base case.  Table 11  presents a parallel set 
of calculations using the 90th percentile of annual earnings as our 1980 anchor. 
Tax/subsidy rates for these two cases are also presented in Figure 15 along with 
the base case. 
We  have already seen  that the incentives to retire at the earliest possible 
date are much stronger for individuals with an  incomplete earning history.  The 
bias of the system toward  "forcing out" Iow-wage earners is  confirmed  by  the 
different patterns of the tax/subsidy rate faced  by  individuals at the 90th and 
10th percentile of the wage distribution.  Whereas for  the former  there is  an 
incentive,  stronger than for  the base case,  to keep  working past 60  and  until 
about the age of 63-64, for the latter the disincentive to do so peaks at 60, both 
in  terms of accrual and tax/subsidy rates. 
Figure 15 also shows that the tax rate for low-wage earners increases sharply 
in the 60-64 age range, contrary to what happens to high-wage earners.  In other 
words, should a Iow-earnings individual  be working at the age of,  say,  61,  he 
would  still find  it advantegeous to quit immediately,  whereas this is  not true 
for the base case or a high-earnings person. 
Table 12 provides the reader with a further appraisal of the extent to which 
the minimum-pension mechanism creates incentives to early retirement for low-
wage earners. It reports tax/subsidy rates with and without minimum pensions 
in  the base case, the incomplete earning history case and the 10th percentile 
case. 
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low-income individual.  The variation caused  by  the minimum-pension on  the 
implicit tax from  continuing to work is  already very  high  at the age  of 55  it 
peaks at 60 and remains substantial also at much later ages.  For a worker with 
incomplete earnings history the effect of the minimum-pension provision is also 
quite relevant until the age of 60 but vanishes rapidly afterwards.  Instead the 
difference caused by the existence of the minimum pension on the tax/subsidy 
for  the base case worker is  always negligible. 
4.3  Discussion 
Our first  concern  is  with  the relationships  between  the incentives  effects  we 
have computed and the retirement facts available. 
Figures 16 and 17 show hazard rates by age for men and women respectively. 
The hazard  rate is  defined  here as minus the percentage change in  the cross-
sectional  age-participation  profile.  For  men,  the  hazard  increases  smoothly 
with  age  and shows clear  peaks at 60  and  65  corresponding,  respectively,  to 
the Spanish  early  and  normal  retirement  ages.  This  is  consistent  with  our 
calculations which show a strong incentive to retire either as early as possible 
(age 60)  for low  income earners and/or workers with incomplete histories and 
at 65 for everybody else. 
Among women things are harder to judge.  The behavior of the hazard rate 
for women is very herratic at almost all ages and there are various small peaks at 
ages between 52 and 61, followed  by the prominent one at age 65.  Our reading 
of the data is  that the only significant  peaks in  the hazard for  women  occurs 
at ages 61  and 65.  All  the other ones are likely  to reflect  pure sample noise, 
although one could  rationalize the presence  of a spike at age  54  through the 
interaction between eligibility requirements and minimum pension provisions. 
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ment are also consistent with the structure of incentives we have derived.  It is 
pointless to apply our calculations to years before 1985.  In  fact, due to the slow 
implementation of the 1985, reform only very recent years may reveal anything 
informative with respect to the working of the curren system. 
Table 13 (based on SS administrative data) reports the distribution, accord-
ing to the age of the pensioner, of the new retirement pensions awarded by the 
general scheme (RGSS) during the year 1991 and 1994.  For workers aged 64 or 
less  we  also report the percentage of the new  pensioners who, for  the reasons 
detailed earlier, were exempted from  the 8 percent penalty generally applicable 
for each year of early retirement. 
The results are startling:  in  spite of the fairly  heavy penalties  associated 
with  early  retirement,  more  than 40  percent  individuals  retire at age  60  or 
earlier.  Furthermore the percentage of those retiring earlier than 65  has been 
increasing steadily in  the last few  years, from  64  percent in  1991  to 70  percent 
in  1994.  The intermediate years  (not reported)  are perfectly consistent with 
this trend. 
Summing up:  the Spanish SS system makes retirement at earlier ages than 
65  the only  rational strategy.  Indeed,  for  workers with earning profiles  below 
the median or with  incomplete earning histories  (a situation particularly fre-
quent among women),  the incentive  to retire as  early as  possible,  i.e.  at age 
60,  is  particularly strong.  The available data on  hazard  rates and  the recent 
retirement patterns are completely consistent with this prediction. 
5  Conclusions 
The Spanish pension system has witnessed a remarkable evolution in  the last 
25 years, moving away from a collection of dispersed and uncoordinated profes-
43 sional schemes toward a more uniform and comprehensive public system. Such 
process has generated a tumultuos growth in  the size and nature of the public 
pension schemes, as well as a rapid increase in the number of retirees with short 
contributive histories receiving the minimum public pension.  Together with the 
dramatic demographic changes affecting Spain since the late seventies, the con-
tinuos enlargement of the public  pension  system  has  been  a  major cause of 
the large financial imbalances which  have come about in  the last decade.  This 
evolution is  not yet completed and the recently enacted changes  (June 1997) 
suggest that further razionalization  and  uniformization  of treatments will  be 
taking place between now and the beginning of the next century. 
A third factor underlying the emergence of financial  distress is  the strong 
reduction in  labor force participation rates among individuals aged 55-65, which 
began  between  1975 and  1980  and is  still  taking place.  This paper examines 
the interplay  between  the incentives  generated  by  the public  pension  system 
and the decision  to retire after the age of 55.  We  quantify such incentives  by 
computing measures of Social Security Wealth and of the implicit tax/subsidy 
to keep working, generated by the current system. 
Our findings  support the intuitive  idea  that pensions-induced  incentives 
matter for  the labor supply  behavior of Spanish  workers.  While the Spanish 
system does not pay a particularly generous average pension  relative to GDP 
per-capita, its "generosity" concentrates in  providing relatively large minimum 
pensions to individuals with below average working histories and/or low wages. 
We show how this fact generates very strong incentives for this people to retire as 
soon as possible.  At the same time, the pension system provides workers earning 
average or above average salaries and complete working histories, with relatively 
weak financial gains from not retiring after the age of 60.  These financial gains 
completely disappear and turn into losses around the age of 63, particularly for 
44 workers who have already reached 35 years of contributions. We have also shown 
how the disability insurance system is being used  "strategically" by individuals 
who cannot legally  anticipate retirement  (e.g.  self-employed  and  farmers)  to 
actually achieve early retirement. 
The combination of these three salient features of the Spanish legislation 
seems to account well for the observed increase in the percentage of early retirees 
among Spanish new pensioners during the nineties. 
It should  be stressed, though, that the possibility of retiring before the age 
of 65 is,  according to current legislation, restricted to those workers who began 
their contributive lifes before 1967.  While this group represents today the bulk 
of the labor force  nearing the age of retirement, its quantitative relevance will 
be rapidly decreasing in  future years. 
It  is  yet  unclear  if  such  privilege  will  be  progressively  extended  also  to 
invididuals who began contributing after such date.  Political  pressure toward 
such  extension  is  currently  being  exercised  from  various  parts and  the final 
outcome is  hard to predict. 
Legislation just enacted (June 26,  1997)  is  ambivalent on  this matter.  On 
the one hand, it links more closely initial pensions to lifelong contributive his-
tories, thereby starting to cut down on  opportunities for  "pension  purchases" 
especially  among self-employed.  On  the other, it mildly  reduces the penaliza-
tion for retiring younger than 65 for individuals with long contributive lifes and 
it leaves untouched both the disability and the minimum pension  mechanisms, 
which  we have singled out as the most powerful incentives for early retirement. 
If anything,  in  fact,  the extension  from  8  to 15  of the number  of years 
over which  the benefit base is  computed may have the effect of increasing the 
number of individuals for  which  the minimum  pension  is  binding.  As we  have 
documented,  workers expecting to receive  a  minimum  pension  have  a strong 
45 incentive to anticipate retirement.  The final  outcome of the recent legislation 
may therefore be  that of just increasing the proportion of the work force  for 
which such incentive matters. 
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48 A  Data appendix 
In  what follows  we  briefly describe the most important data sources employed 
in  this chapter. We  also mention some other potentially useful data sources. 
A.I  Microdata 
A.I.I  Encuesta de Poblaci6n Activa (EPA) 
This is a quarterly CPS-like survey of roughly 60,000 Spanish households car-
ried out by  the Spanish  National Statistical Institute (INE). It contains fairly 
detailed  information  on  labor force  status, education  and  family  background 
variables but, unfortunately, no  information on  wages and incomes.  This fea-
ture is  common to most European-style labor force surveys.  Publicly released 
cross-sectional files  are available from  1976. 
From  1987,  INE also  releases the Encuesta de  Poblaci6n Activa Enlazada, 
which  is  the panel  version  of EPA  obtained  by  exploiting  the rotating cross-
section  nature of the survey.  It contains fewer  variables,  but it permits to 
follow  individuals for up to 6 quarters. 
A.I.2  Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF) 
It is  a  cross-sectional  household  budget survey carried  out by  INE in  1973-
74,  1980-81  and  1990-91, with  reference  to income  and  expenditure  in  the 
previous calendar year. The 1990-91 sample, used in this paper, contains 21,155 
households and 72,123 persons. 
A.I.3  Administrative records from Social Security 
The third  microdata set used  in  this  paper is  a  random  sample of 1  every 
200  pensioners on  file  at the INSS  on  January 1993.  The sample consists of 
32,366 observations out of a  universe of 6,473,200 pensioners.  The data pro-
vide information on  initial and current pensions.  The difference between these 
49 two concepts is  broken down into revalorization and complement to minimum 
pension, which  permits us to construct a measure of SS generosity. 
A.1.4  Other microdata 
Encuesta de  Estructura Salarial:  It was carried out by INE in  1995.  It provides 
detailed  information on wages, working hours and personal characteristics for 
about 175,000 workers in  19,000 establishments. 
Encuesta Continua de  Presupuestos Familiares: This is a rotating household 
survey  carried out quarterly  by  INE since  1985.  It collects data on  income, 
consumption and personal characteristic for about 3,000 households.  One eigth 
of the sample is  replaced at each  rotation. 
A.2  Aggregate annual or monthly data 
Boletin de  Estadisticas Laborales:  Published by the Ministry of Labor (MTSS), 
it contains data from  1981 on  the most important SS  programs. 
Boletin  Informativo  de  la  SS:  Published  by  the Direcci6n  General  de  la 
SS,  MTSS,  it  contains detailed  information  on  social  security  expenditures, 
including medical care, from  1981. 
Encuesta de  Salarios en la  Industria y los Servicios:  It is a quarterly survey 
on  wages and hours worked carried out by  INE at the establishment level. 
50 B  Overview of the literature on SS  and retirement 
in Spain 
We have been able to trace the existence of only one investigation of the impact 
of the Spanish  SS  system  upon  labour supply  and, in  particular,  retirement 
decisions.  Martin and Moreno (1990) look at weekly work hours over the period 
1964-84 using net and gross SS wealth as explanatory variables.  A fairly simple 
econometric  analysis  leads  to the conclusion  that the negative  income  effect 
associated to SS contributions more than compensate for both the susbstitution 
effect toward leisure and the increase in expected wealth induced by the promise 
of a pension  payment, thereby increasing the overalllabor supply. 
The rest of the existing literature concentrates almost exclusively upon two 
issues: 
1.  The financial  evolution  of the system  and  the dramatic increase in  its 
current account deficit as a consequence of both the system's generosity 
and the adverse demographic evolution. 
2.  The redistributive features of the system and, in  particular, the existence 
of a  wide  dispersion  in  the internal rates of return across different  pro-
grams. 
B.l  Analysis of the long-run sustainability 
Recent years have witnessed the publication of a large number of studies con-
cerned with the long-run viability of the Spanish public pension system and with 
its capability to sustain the undergoing demographic changes.  Among them are 
the monographs by  Barea (1995), Barea et al.  (1996), Herce et al.  (1995), IN-
VERCO (1996), Ministerio de Trabajo (1995), Piiiera and Weinstein  (1996), as 
well  as the interesting papers by Herce (1997) and Jimeno and Licandro (1996). 
51 While the various authors reach different conclusions upon the type of re-
form  which  would  result more appropriate, they pretty much  express similar 
concerns about the economic viability of the existing system. 
Normalizing at zero the deficit of the Social Security system in  1995, the 
estimates for 2010 range from -.8 to -3.5 percent of the GDP, with an average of 
-1.5 percent. For 2025 the average deficit prediction is of -2.6 with a range going 
from -1.0 to -4.2 percent of GDP. Most studies are based on a set of macroeco-
nomic  predictions that, while  not exagerately optimistic, are nevertheless not 
obviously  achievable.  In  general an average growth rate of GDP at 3 percent 
per year is assumed, together with a substantial increase in  labor participation 
rates (up to 70 percent in 2010) and a reduction in the unemployment rate fromt 
he  current 23  percent to about 16-18 percent.  Barring substantial structural 
reforms these predictions are hardly realistic in  the light of the performances of 
the Spanish economy over the last 20 years. 
B.2  Analysis of the redistributive effects 
Most studies concentrate upon the period prior to the 1978 reform and only a 
few  are able to cover more recent years.  The unit of investigation is  always the 
individ ual  agent, not the household,  and income is  very often measured as an 
annual flow  and not as total lifetime income. 
For  the earlier  period  there is  a  widespread  consensus  on  the  regressive 
nature of the combined  SS  and fiscal  system [see,  e.g.  Castellano  (1977)  and 
Vereda and Moch6n (1978)]. The studies we have exhamined, though, are rather 
imprecise and nai"ve in  both their theoretical apparatus, the quality of'the data 
available  and the econometric techniques adopted.  We  find  their conclusions 
rather dubious. 
After  1978  things  look  quite  different.  While  an  early  study  [Argim6n 
52 and  Gonzalez-Paramo (1987)]  still finds  evidence  of a  regressive effect  in  the 
structure of contributions, this is  not the case when  pension expenditures are 
taken into consideration [Medel et al. (1988)].  More recently a number offairly 
complete studies [(Monasterio and Suarez  (1992), Melis  and  Diaz  (1993)  and 
Bandres and Cuenca (1996)] unequivocally document the very strong and pro-
gressive  redistribution  accomplished  by  the post-1978 and  post-1985 Spanish 
pension systems. 
These more  recent studies do not restrict their analysis to annual income 
flows  but manage to construct relatively credible indeces of life-time contribu-
tions and payments according to professional status and decile  position in  the 
overall  distribution  of earnings,  and  to compute internal  rates of returns for 
different SS  programs and income profiles. 
Their, fairly  uniform conclusions, can be summarized as follows: 
•  For most SS  programs, both past and current contribution/payment pro-
files give rise to a rather large intergenerational transfer. For example, the 
ratio of net transfers to the total present value of pensions for individuals 
affiliated  to the REEH  went from  61.2  percent  before  the reform  to 52 
percent after (using a discount rate of 3 percent) . 
•  The only important exception to this rule is given  by the general scheme 
before and, especially, after the 1985 reform.  In this case, the net lifetime 
SS  wealth was  positive  (and  equal  to about 30  percent of total pension 
present value)  before the reform, only if a real discount rate of 1 percent 
were used.  It turned negative when a 3 percent discount rate was applied, 
and  it remained  negative in  either cases  after the reform.  It turns out 
to be  particuarly large  (50  percent of total pension  present value)  when 
discounted at 3 percent. 
53 •  Both  the old  and  the current Spanish  SS  systems generate  very  large 
intragenerational transfers from  the general  to all  the special  schemes. 
Domestic workers and small farmers are by far the largest beneficiaries of 
such transfers. 
•  If one looks at the intragenerational transfers occurring not across pro-
grams but across income deciles,  the Spanish SS system turns out to be a 
very progressive one:  up to 90  percent of the total present value of pen-
sions to which individuals in the first decile ofthe earnings distribution are 
entitled are a pure transfer.  This transfer's percentage decrease  rathers 
slowly  as one moves up with earnings and changes sign  only for the very 
last decile  (or the last two, depending on  details of the calculations). 
54 Tal::le  1:  Annual  growth  rates of real  pension  expenditures,  number of pen-
sions and real average pension  (1994 prices), 1980-1995. Source:  Ministerio de 
Trabajo (1995). 
Type of pension  Total 
Old-age  Disability  Widows  Orphans  Other reI. 
Pension expenditures 
80-85  5.5  9.3  4.6  3.2  4.9  6.4 
85-90  5.9  3.5  7.8  2.2  3.5  5.5 
90-95  5.8  3.9  6.3  1.4  6.3  5.3 
Number of pensions 
80-85  2.4  7.3  4.7  2.5  3.7  4.2 
85-90  2.9  1.6  4.0  1.0  3.0  2.8 
90-95  3.2  1.3  3.5  .7  12.1  2.8 
A  verage pension 
80-85  1.8  1.3  -.9  .3  -1.1  1.1 
85-90  2.7  2.3  3.7  1.4  .9  2.6 
90-95  2.4  2.2  2.7  .3  -4.7  2.3 
Table 2:  Floors and ceilings on  monthly earnings (1000 pta. at current prices). 
Professional category  1990  1996 
floor  ceiling  floor  ceiling 
Engineers and college graduates  87.150  291.540  113.070  374.880 
Technical engineers  72.270  291.540  93.780  374.880 
Supervisors and foremen  62.820  291.540  81.510  374.880 
Administrative assistant  58.350  291.540  75.690  374.880 
Clerks  58.350  185.820  75.690  279.390 
Janitors  58.350  164.400  75.690  279.390 
Clerk Assistants  58.350  164.400  75.690  279.390 
Table 3:  Replacement rates by  age and number of years of contribution. 
Years of  Age 
contribution  60  61  62  63  64  65+ 
15  .360  .408  .456  .504  .552  .600 
20  .420  .476  .532  .588  .644  .700 
25  .480  .544  .608  .672  .736  .800 
30  .540  .612  .684  .756  .828  .900 
31  .552  .626  .699  .773  .846  .920 
32  .564  .639  .714  .790  .865  .940 
33  .576  .653  .730  .806  .883  .960 
34  .588  .666  .745  .823  .902  .980 
35+  .600  .680  .760  .840  .920  1.000 
55 Table 4:  Annualized minimum wage  (S~lI) and minimum and maximum annual 
pensions (1000 pta. at current prices). 
Annualized  Minimum pension  Maximum 
Year  SMI  With dep. spouse  Without dep. spouse  pension 
< 65  > 65  < 65  > 65 
1985  520.380  355.530  406.000  336.490  384.860  2631.300 
1986  561.960  399.000  455.840  364.000  417.200  2631.300 
1987  590.100  430.920  492.310  412.860  442.260  2631.300 
1988  616.560  465.500  532.000  411.040  471.100  2631.300 
1989  650.720  520.870  595.350  441.490  505.960  2710.400 
1990  700.140  575.820  658.140  488.040  559.300  2900.128 
1991  745.500  614.460  702.240  520.800  596.820  3094.448 
1992  787.920  649.530  742.280  550.550  630.840  3270.834 
1993  819.420  682.710  780.150  578.690  663.040  3437.644 
1994  847.980  712.810  814.520  604.170  692.230  3557.960 
1995  877.800  744.240  850.360  630.770  722.750  3714.508 
1996  908.880  770.350  880.180  652.890  748.090  3877.944 
Table 5:  Percentage ratio between the number of disability pensions paid and 
the number of workers covered by the various SS  programs, 1981-1994: General 
Fund (RGSS), self-employed  (RETA), agricultural employees (REAa), farmers 
(REAb), coal miners (REMC), sailors (RETM), domestic workers (REEH). 
Year  RGSS  RETA  REAa  REAb  REMC  RETM  REEH  Total 
1981  .79  1.06  2.29  2.14  2.33  - 2.32  1.10 
1982  1.15  1.06  3.17  2.34  3.61  - 2.79  1.45 
1983  1.31  1.03  3.02  2.33  3.21  - 2.88  1.54 
1984  1.17  .83  2.41  2.14  2.91  - 2.57  1.33 
1985  .72  .58  1.61  1.80  1.52  - 2.48  .90 
1986  .62  .57  1.67  1.97  1.80  1.58  1.93  .83 
1987  .55  .51  1.34  1.84  1.42  1.34  2.00  .72 
1988  .52  .51  1.21  2.06  1.69  1.45  2.21  .70 
1989  .43  .43  1.13  1.95  1.64  1.12  2.25  .60 
1990  .44  .51  1.21  2.38  2.36  1.22  2.90  .62 
1991  .41  .57  1.30  2.58  2.18  1.18  3.30  .62 
1992  .47  .64  1.37  2.53  2.37  1.26  3.12  .67 
1993  .47  .68  1.25  2.15  2.29  1.25  2.85  .64 
1994  .44  .77  1.35  1.91  2.03  1.24  2.75  .61 
56 Table 6: Fraction of new disability pensions awarded to individuals aged 55+ by 
SS program and level of disability:  Inability to do the usual job (IPT), inability 
to do any kind of job (IPA), complete inability (GI). Year 1994. 
Program  IPT  IPA  GI 
RGSS  4.0  43.5  39.3 
RETA  53.4  64.4  49.3 
REA  58.5  63.7  68.9 
REMC  .3  48.6  60.0 
RETM  14.9  32.1  32.0 
REEH  25.0  75.0  80.6 
Table 7:  Incentive calculations for base case.  After-tax values in  1000 pta. at 
1995 prices. 
Age at last  Replacem.  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Projected  Taxi 
year of work  rate  rate  earnings  subsidy 
54  11343.7  1533.6 
55  11006.9  -336.8  -.030  1557.5  .216 
56  10836.9  -170.0  -.015  1572.4  .108 
57  10598.0  -238.9  -.022  1558.8  .153 
58  10025.0  -573.1  -.054  1582.3  .362 
59  .590  9566.8  -458.2  -.046  1603.8  .286 
60  .661  9809.7  242.9  .025  1625.2  -.149 
61  .730  10008.0  198.3  .020  1648.2  -.120 
62  .816  10193.3  185.3  .019  1648.6  -.112 
63  .895  10117.1  -76.2  -.007  1649.4  .046 
64  .996  9860.6  -256.5  -.025  1606.9  .160 
65  .998  8629.4  -1231.3  -.125  1627.5  .757 
66  .996  7364.4  -1264.9  -.147  1648.4  .767 
67  .988  6067.9  -1296.5  -.176  1669.6'  .777 
68  .981  4815.7  -1252.2  -.206  1691.0  .741 
69  .973  3608.2  -1207.5  -.251  1712.7  .705 
57 Table 8:  Incentive calculations for  the case of a single worker.  After-tax values 
in  1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last  Replacem.  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Projected  Taxi 
year of work  rate  rate  earmngs  subsidy 
54  9159.8  1533.6 
55  8847.4  -312.4  -.034  1557.5  .201 
56  8697.0  -150.4  -.017  1572.4  .096 
57  8459.9  -237.1  -.027  1558.8  .152 
58  7897.5  -562.4  -.066  1582.3  .355 
59  .590  7449.4  -448.1  -.057  1603.8  .279 
60  .661  7570.2  120.8  .016  1625.2  -.074 
61  .730  7553.3  -17.0  -.002  1648.2  .010 
62  .816  7501.2  -52.1  -.007  1648.6  .032 
63  .895  7226.1  -275.1  -.037  1649.4  .167 
64  .996  6802.1  -424.0  -.059  1606.9  .264 
65  .998  5616.4  -1185.7  -.174  1627.5  .729 
66  .996  4421.8  -1194.6  -.213  1648.4  .725 
67  .988  3222.7  -1199.1  -.271  1669.6  .718 
68  .981  2078.4  -1144.2  -.355  1691.0  .677 
69  .973  989.5  -1088.9  -.524  1712.7  .636 
Table  9:  Incentive  calculations  for  the case  of incomplete  earnings  history. 
After-tax values in  1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last  Replacem.  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Projected  Taxi 
year of work  rate  rate  earnings  subsidy 
54  10446.4  1533.6 
55  10022.4  -424.0  -.041  1557.5  .272 
56  9664.3  -358.1  -.036  1572.4  .228 
57  9406.9  -257.5  -.027  1558.8  .165 
58  9005.5  -401.4  -.043  1582.3  .254 
59  .536  8687.4  -318.1  -.035  1603.8  .198 
60  .613  8886.4  199.0  .023  1625.2  -.122 
61  .691  9253.5  367.1  .041  1648.2  -.223 
62  .787  9670.8  417.3  .045  1648.6  -.253 
63  .880  9851.4  180.6  .019  1649.4  -.109 
64  .996  9860.6  9.3  .000  1606.9  -.006 
65  .998  8629.4  -1231.3  -.125  1627:5  .757 
66  .996  7364.4  -1264.9  -.147  1648.4  .767 
67  .988  6067.9  -1296.5  -.176  1669.6  .777 
68  .981  4815.7  -1252.2  -.206  1691.0  .741 
69  .973  3608.2  -1207.5  -.251  1712.7  .705 
58 Table 10:  Incentive calculations for the 10th percentile earnings case.  After-tax 
values in  1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age at last  Replacem.  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Projected  Taxi 
year of work  rate  rate  earnings  subsidy 
54  10621.0  889.8 
55  10334.2  -286.9  -.027  904.1  .317 
56  10052.2  -282.0  -.027  913.1  .309 
57  9776.9  -275.2  -.027  904.9  .304 
58  9513.9  -263.0  -.027  919.0  .286 
59  .741  9255.8  -258.1  -.027  931.9  .277 
60  .731  8444.5  -811.3  -.088  944.8  .859 
61  .722  7659.2  -785.3  -.093  958.6  .819 
62  .810  6954.4  -704.8  -.092  958.9  .735 
63  .892  6431.7  -522.7  -.075  959.3  .545 
64  .996  6070.7  -361.0  -.0.56  933.8  .387 
65  .998  5342.6  -i28.1  -.120  946.2  .770 
66  .996  4604.1  -738.5  -.138  958.8  .770 
67  .988  3855.8  -748.4  -.163  971.5  .770 
68  .980  3132.6  -723.1  -.188  984.4  .735 
69  .972  2435.9  -696.7  -.222  997.4  .698 
Table 11:  Incentive calculations for the 90th percentile earnings case.  After-tax 
values in  1000 pta. at 1995 prices. 
Age  at last  Replacem.  SSW  Accrual  Accrual  Projected  Taxi 
year of work  rate  rate  earnings  subsidy 
54  18450.0  2561.6 
55  17800.3  -649.7  -.035  2603.0  .250 
56  17427.6  -372.7  -.021  2630.5  .142 
57  16829.3  -598.3  -.034  2610.5  .229 
58  15565.3  -1264.0  -.075  2631.4  .480 
59  .561  14789.6  -775.7  -.050  2666.6  .291 
60  .627  15210.1  420.6  .028  2701.7  -.156 
61  .691  15398.5  188.4  .012  2739.6  -.069 
62  .776  15711.9  313.4  .020  2740.2  -.114 
63  .859  15710.4  -1.5  -.000  2741.5  .000 
64  .966  15490.9  -219.4  -.014  2671.6  .082 
65  .982  13769.4  -1721.5  -.111  2705.6  .636 
66  .996  12002.4  -1767.0  -.128  2739.9  .645 
67  .988  9802.4  -2200.0  -.183  2774.7  .793 
68  .981  7677.5  -2124.9  -.217  2809.9  .756 
69  .973  5628.5  -2049.0  -.267  2845.6  .720 
59 Table 12:  Tax/subsidy rates with and without minimum  pensions. 
Age at last  Base case  incomplete history  10th percentile 
year of work  with  without  with  without  with  without 
55  .216  .172  .272  .058  .317  .150 
56  .108  .050  .228  -.052  .309  .027 
57  .153  .123  .165  -.000  .304  .101 
58  .362  .372  .254  .217  .286  .355 
59  .286  .284  .198  .141  .277  .267 
60  -.149  -.221  -.122  -.331  .859  -.264 
61  -.120  -.127  -.223  -.256  .819  -.172 
62  -.112  -.112  -.253  -.254  .735  -.161 
63  .046  .046  -.109  -.109  .545  .001 
64  .160  .160  -.006  -.006  .387  .118 
65  .757  .757  .757  .757  .770  .738 
66  .767  .767  .767  .767  .770  .751 
67  .777  .777  .777  .777  .770  .762 
68  .741  .741  .741  .741  .735  .726 
69  .705  .705  .705  .705  .698  .691 
Table 13:  Age-distribution of new  pensioners,  1991  and 1994. 
1991  1994 
Age  Penalty  Ko Penalty  Total  Penalty  No Penalty  Total 
~ 60  38.61  1.81  40.42  37.84  2.89  40.73 
61  5.91  .32  6.23  7.20  .34  7.54 
62  5.72  .27  6.00  7.39  .35  7.74 
63  4.71  .51  5.22  6.13  .34  6.46 
64  4.22  1.83  6.04  5.22  2.25  7.47 
65  - - 31.38  - - 26.39 
66  - - 1. 71  - - 1.17 
67  - - .93  - - .72 
68  - - .58  - - .50 
69  - - .41  - - .39 
> 70  - - 1.07  - - .89 
< 65  59.17  4.74  63.92  63.79  6.16  69.95 
> 65  - - 36.08  - - 30.05 
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85  90  94 Figure 4:  Fraction of workers covered  by  the SS system . 
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64 Figure 5:  Old-age and  survivors' (OAS)  and  disability  (DJ)  pension  recipiency 
among people aged 55+. 
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Figure 6:  Replacement  rates. 
o  ratlo 
o  ratio 
I 
72  75  E: 
66 
,... =:: c 
_  ~2L:!Cl 
85  90 Figure 7:  Participation rates by  age and  sex. 
omen  6  women 
.9 
.8 














~5  50  55  60  65  70 
age 
67 Figure 8:  Distribution of activities of men  by  age. 
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65  70  75 Figure 9:  Distrihution of activities of women  by  age. 
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65  70  75 Figure 10:  Public income recipiency  by  age for  men. 
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75 Figure 12:  Distribution of affiliated to SS by program: General scheme (RGSS), 
self-employed (RETA), agricultural workers and small farmers (REA), domestic 
workers (REEH). Annual averages 1982-1996. 
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72 Figure  13:  Fraction of pensioners receiving complements to the minimum  and 
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73 Figure 14:  Distribution of male disability pensions outstanding in  1993 by  age 
group and year of award. 
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